

EC Tender project contract N° ENER/2022/NUCL/SI2.880751

SAMIRA Study on reporting and learning from patient-related incidents and near misses in radiotherapy, interventional cardiology, nuclear medicine and interventional and diagnostic radiology

Survey Methodology and Results of Questionnaires and Expert Interviews

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Online Surveys

- **Competent authorities:** The Heads of the European Radiological Protection Competent Authorities (HERCA) is a member of the project Advisory Board and as such made available its network of national CAs and distributed the survey among the members of the Working Group on Medical Applications (WG MA). The consortium reached out to health authority contacts available through other quality and safety projects (e.g., QUADRANT, EU-REST), as in some countries health authorities have competence in the field of ILSs. At the request of the European Commission, the members of the SAMIRA SGQS were not invited to complete the survey.
- **National professional societies:** To understand the implementation of the BSSD requirements at member state level from the perspective of the professional stakeholders, the European PSs represented in the consortium (ESTRO, EFOMP) as well as in the Advisory Board (EANM, ESR, CIRSE, EAPCI, EFRS) were asked to distribute the survey among their national professional member societies, via their national delegates in quality & safety committees or similar depending on their organisational structures. As the European PSs have long-standing contacts with their national counterparts, qualified responses from the EU-27 as well as Norway and Switzerland were obtained.

Online Surveys

- **Individual hospitals:** To understand the implementation of ILSs from a practical point of view, it was considered important to survey and evaluate the situation directly in a representative sample of European hospitals, taking into account discipline variation as well as potential gaps, barriers, common issues and the need for European action and guidance. In order to ensure a structured approach and to avoid bias (e.g. by contacting the EuroSafe Imaging Stars network only), the consortium decided to ask EFOMP to contact its national member organisations to identify a representative selection of 5-10 hospitals in their country, covering all radiation risk areas as well as the public and private sectors and including a relevant contact person, e.g., the medical physicist in charge of incident reporting.

Online Surveys (CA)

The content of the survey to the CAs included the following.


- National legal provisions for the implementation of regulatory ILSs for significant events after the BSSD transposition
- Organization of the CAs for the management of significant events
- Areas where an ILS is working (radiotherapy, nuclear medicine, diagnostic and interventional radiology)
- Type of incidents reported (only significant events or also other minor events or near miss for learning purposes)
- Definition of significant events, minor events and near misses in every area
- Evidence of functioning: Number of significant events reported annually, events analysed by the regulator, example of safety measures implemented
- Mechanisms for the timely dissemination of information, relevant to radiation protection in medical exposure, regarding lessons learned from significant events. Frequency of feedback
- Existence of regulatory systems to identify those facilities with no or few reports submitted and analysed in the local ILSs
- Composition of the group in charge of the analysis and feedback of the lessons learned from significant events. Support from experts
- Main gaps and barriers found in the implementation of the regulatory ILSs
- Collection of references of available guidance, resources, and good practices

Online Surveys (PS and Hospitals)

The content of the survey to national PSs and selected hospitals on the development of local ILSs included the following.

- National legal provisions for the implementation of hospital or department ILS after Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom transposition
- Areas where an ILS is currently in place (e.g., radiotherapy, nuclear medicine, diagnostic and interventional radiology, interventional cardiology)
- Type of incidents reported (radiation exposure significant events, near misses, both, events not concerning radiation exposure)
- Criteria to report significant events in every area to the national authority. Number of significant events reported in the last years
- Evidence of functioning: number of reports in every area, criteria to analyse events, percent of events analysed, example of safety measures implemented as a consequence of the analysis
- Composition of the patient safety and quality team in every area. Frequency of meetings. Dependency of the team within the organisation
- Information about training of staff both to enable correct reporting at ground level and to allow for adequate analysis/feedback/learning
- Internal feedback and learning after the analysis
- Criteria or recommendations followed for the harmonisation of fields, structure and coding system of the ILS
- Arrangements to inform the referrer, the practitioner and the patient about unintended or accidental exposures
- Contribution to anonymous voluntary external ILSs. Other means of communicating and sharing lessons learnt externally
- Main gaps and barriers found in the implementation of the local ILSs
- Collection of references of available guidance, resources, and good practices (for national PSs)

Online Surveys



- CAs: 23 from 23 countries
- PSs: 94 from 28 countries
- Hospitals: 55 from 19 countries

Online Surveys

Competent authorities



Fig. 2: Countries represented among responses from CAs (dark green)

Online Surveys

Table 2: Replies from national PSs considered for data analysis

	IR	MP	NM	RG	RY	RT	IC	RY & NM	other	Total
AT	1		1		1	1				4
BE			1	1		1				3
BG			1							1
HR	1	1	1	1						4
CY		1	1			1				3
CZ			1			1				2
DK	1		1	2	1	1				6
EE			1	1						2
FI	1		1		1				1	4
FR		1			1	1				3
DE	1	1	1		1	1				5
GR	1		1			1				3
HU			1		1					2
IE		1	1	1	1					4
IT		1	1		1	1				4
LV			1							1
LT	1				1	1				3
LU										0
MT		1						1		2
NL	1		1	1			1			4
NO		1		1	1					3
PL		1	1			1				3
PT	1		1	1	1		1			5
RO	1		1							2
SK					1					1
SI						1	1			2
ES	1	1	1	1	2	2				8
SE		2	1		1	1			1	6
CH	1		1	1			1			4
	12	12	22	11	15	15	4	1	2	94

Online Surveys

Hospitals




Fig. 10: Countries represented among responses from hospitals (dark green), including the number of replies per country

Online Surveys (CA)

3.3 Analysis of Survey to Competent Authorities

The survey was targeted for radiation protection and health authorities, referred to as CAs.

All 23 countries have transposed the BSSD regarding incident reporting of significant events involving ionising radiation for patients into their national legislative framework.

In all countries that replied to the survey, the regulatory system of reporting and learning applies to the following.

- External beam radiotherapy
- Brachytherapy
- Therapeutic nuclear medicine (vectorised internal radiation therapy)
- Diagnostic nuclear medicine
- Diagnostic radiology
- Fluoroscopically-guided interventional radiology
- Interventional cardiology

Denmark, France and Ireland also indicate that they have a reporting and learning system for dental imaging.

All 23 countries have a national/regional authority specifically designated as CA for the management of declared significant events involving ionising radiation.

Online Surveys (CA)

Despite all the countries having a CA for the management of declared significant events involving ionising radiation, some differences exist regarding the kinds of events reported (Table 4), namely for the following five types of events.

- Events involving accidental medical exposures
- Events involving unintended medical exposures
- Events involving potentially accidental (near misses) medical exposures
- Events involving potentially unintended exposures
- Events involving malfunction of medical devices

Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Norway, Portugal and Sweden are the countries that include all five listed events, while Estonia is the only country that did not report any.

Online Surveys (CA)

The CAs were asked whether they had defined specific criteria for reporting by hospitals that undertook the radiation modalities above (see the summary in appendix 4). One CA had delegated the task of developing modality specific criteria to the relevant national PSs.

For the high-risk areas of external beam radiotherapy (EBRT) and brachytherapy, 16 out of 23 CAs had issued specific criteria (see the summary in appendix 4).

For nuclear medicine services, the picture was as follows: 9 out of 23 CAs had specific criteria for therapeutic nuclear medicine and diagnostic nuclear medicine and, respectively, 6 out of 23 and 4 out of 23 had generalised criteria, while 8 out of 23 and 10 out of 23 had no answer or no criteria.

In diagnostic radiology, 11 out of 23 CAs had specific criteria, 3 out of 23 had generalised criteria, and 9 out of 23 had no criteria or did not answer the question. Of the 11 CAs that answered "Yes" to this question, one CA only had criteria for foetal dose.

In interventional radiology and cardiology, the picture was exactly the same for all CAs, with none having different criteria for interventional radiology compared to interventional cardiology. The situation was as follows: 12 out of 23 had specific criteria (again with 1 CA only having foetal dose as a criteria), 4 out of 23 had generalised criteria, and 7 out of 23 had no criteria or no answer to the question.

Of the CAs that did not report criteria, 2 out of 23 reported that they were developing such criteria.

Online Surveys (CA)

In the last 5 years (2018–2022) there have been 2964 significant events reported to the CAs, although some of the systems were not operational in 2018 and started to collect data later. External beam radiotherapy, diagnostic nuclear medicine and diagnostic radiology are amongst the modalities with higher numbers reported.

Total number of significant events per modality in the last 5 years (2018–2022)




Fig. 11: Total number of significant events per modality in the last 5 years (2018–2022)

Online Surveys (CA)

External beam radiotherapy (total 5 years 2018–2022) per country




Fig. 12: Significant events in EBRT (total 5 years 2018–2022)

Online Surveys (CA)

The role of the CA in managing reported significant events varies between countries.

The survey asked specifically about the following.

- Event report analysis
- Adopting corrective measures
- Inspections
- Soliciting experts
- Carrying out periodic reviews
- Dissemination of lessons learned

The results per each country are presented in Table 6. Belgium, Czechia, France, Luxembourg, Norway and Portugal are among the countries that have a role in all the areas defined.

Table 6: Role of the CA in managing reported significant events (✓ - with role; X - no role)

Country	Event Report Analysis	Adopting Corrective Measures	Inspections	Soliciting Experts	Performing Periodic Reviews	Dissemination of Lessons Learned	✓	X
✓	21	13	21	9	11	17		
X	2	10	2	14	12	6		

Online Surveys (CA)

Table 7: Estimation of the possible rate of underreporting of significant events

On a national level, can you estimate the possible rate of underreporting of significant events involving ionising radiation?		On a national level, can you estimate the possible rate of underreporting of significant events involving ionising radiation	
BE	Common	LU	I don't know
BG	Rare	MT	I don't know
HR	I don't know	NL	I don't know
CZ	Common	NO	Common
DK	I don't know	PT	Common
EE	None	RO	Common
FI	Common	ES	Common
FR	I don't know	SE	Common
DE	I don't know	CH	Common
GR	Common		
HU	I don't know	Common	11
IE	I don't know	Rare	1
LV	Common	None	1
LT	I don't know	I don't know	10

Online Surveys (PS)

3.4 Analysis of Survey to Professional Societies

This survey was addressed to various European PSs involved with medical applications of ionising radiation. Included were PSs in the fields of medical physics, radiotherapy, clinical oncology, cancer nursing, nuclear medicine, radiography, radiology, interventional radiology, and interventional cardiology. A few PSs also represented a combination of these medical fields.

The main good practices from answers to the survey question "Please specify any additional means of support to the competent authority (CA) for managing reported significant events provided by the society?" are listed below.

- Official publications in the form of reports and recommendations, at least annually
- Newsletter and email dissemination of information, mostly monthly
- Recording presentations for dissemination

The survey queried the respondents on whether their organisation was somehow involved with quality and risk management. The results are shown in Table 8.

Table 8: An overview of PSs that have active quality and risk management initiatives within their respective societies

Area of professional society	Quality and risk management
Interventional cardiology (IC)	1 out of 4
Interventional radiology (IR)	2 out of 12
Medical physics (MP)	6 out of 12
Nuclear medicine (NM)	7 out of 22
Radiography (RG)	7 out of 11
Radiology (RY)	9 out of 15
Radiology and Nuclear Medicine (RYNM)	0 out of 1
Radiotherapy (RT)	7 out of 15
Other	0 out of 2
Total	39 out of 94

Online Surveys (PS)

Table 12: An overview, by PS area, of the answers to the question: "Has the society cooperated/contributed somehow in the process of revising this provision?"

Area of Professional society	Yes	No	Don't know	No answer	Total
Interventional cardiology (4)	0%	50%	50%	0%	100%
Interventional radiology (12)	8%	42%	50%	0%	100%
Medical physics (12)	50%	33%	8%	8%	100%
Nuclear medicine (22)	36%	23%	32%	9%	100%
Radiography (11)	55%	9%	27%	9%	100%
Radiology (15)	40%	33%	20%	7%	100%
Radiology and Nuclear Medicine (1)	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Radiotherapy (15)	13%	40%	27%	20%	100%
Other (2)	0%	50%	50%	0%	100%
Average	34%	31%	29%	6%	100%

From the survey replies, MP and RG societies seem to have a higher level of involvement in the national regulatory process, Furthermore, many PSs of all types indicated in free-text answers that they were involved in the drafting stage of national regulations in many ways, including the following.

- Reviewing drafts
- Meetings with regulators to discuss issues
- Contributing to expert advisory groups
- Co-opted on to the drafting team for new regulations
- Part of the general consultation with stakeholders

Online Surveys (PS)

Table 14 PS answers to the question: "Is there a national/regional authority specifically designated as competent to be in charge of the management of declared significant events?"

Area of Professional society	Yes	No	Don't know	No answer	Total
Interventional cardiology (4)	50%	50%	0%	0%	100%
Interventional radiology (12)	50%	8%	42%	0%	100%
Medical physics (12)	92%	0%	0%	8%	100%
Nuclear medicine (22)	68%	9%	14%	9%	100%
Radiography (11)	78%	11%	0%	11%	100%
Radiology (15)	82%	9%	0%	9%	100%
Radiology and Nuclear Medicine (1)	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Radiotherapy (15)	67%	7%	7%	20%	100%
Other (2)	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Average	76%	10%	7%	6%	100%

For the 67 PSs that answered "Yes" (76%), one society did not specify the name of the CA as required by the survey, and one society gave an unusable answer. In general, these survey replies from PSs indicate that the knowledge of CAs in charge of the management of declared significant events is good.

Online Surveys (PS)

Table 16: An overview, by PS area, the number of respondents who indicated that their society supports CAs in managing reported significant events

Area of Professional Society	The PS Supports the CA
Interventional cardiology	3 out of 4
Interventional radiology	5 out of 12
Medical physics	3 out of 12
Nuclear medicine	8 out of 22
Radiography	2 out of 11
Radiology	5 out of 15
Radiology and nuclear medicine	0 out of 1
Radiotherapy	5 out of 15
Other	0 out of 2
Total	31 out of 94

Table 17: An overview by country of how PSs supports CAs in managing reported significant events (note that more than one answer per respondent was possible)

Country	Event report analysis	Adopting corrective measures at national level based on events analysis	Dissemination of lessons learned	Clinical audit of the reporting institution
Total	16	15	27	12

Online Surveys (PS)

Table 19: Summary of the survey respondents free-text answers to the question "In your experience, what are the main supports in implementing an incident/reporting and learning system"

Main Supports in Implementing an Incident-Reporting and Learning System	
Local Level	National Level
Having a quality department supporting safety, reporting, events analysis and lessons dissemination, and having the expertise of medical physics experts to also support	Having specific provisions protecting reporters
Having specific "no blame, no shame" policy supporting learning culture	Online and easily accessible reporting systems
Staff education in reporting	Education and training in reporting and safety culture
Easy to use electronic reporting system	

Table 20: Summary of the survey respondents' free-text answers to the question "From your own experience, which are the main barriers in implementing an incident-reporting and learning system?"

Main Barriers in Implementing an Incident-Reporting and Learning System	
Local Level	National Level
Fear of sanctions / litigations / repercussions if declaring significant events.	Fear of sanctions / litigations / repercussions if declaring significant events.
Lack of safety culture and education in reporting.	Lack of funding incentives.
Lack of time and "easy to use" reporting systems.	Lack of communication/feedback.
	Lack of education training in safety culture and reporting.

Online Surveys (PS)

Table 22: An overview by PS area of respondents' survey replies to the question: "Do you carry out initiatives to promote safety through incident reporting systems?"

Area of Professional society	Yes	No	No answer	Total
Interventional cardiology (4)	0%	100%	0%	100%
Interventional radiology (12)	33%	42%	25%	100%
Medical physics (12)	33%	50%	17%	100%
Nuclear medicine (22)	36%	45%	18%	100%
Radiography (11)	55%	27%	18%	100%
Radiology (15)	33%	47%	20%	100%
Radiology and Nuclear Medicine (1)	0%	100%	0%	100%
Radiotherapy (15)	47%	20%	33%	100%
Other (2)	50%	50%	0%	100%
Average	32%	54%	15%	100%

Online Surveys (PS)

Table 24: By PS area, the answers to the question: "Do you think that the competent authority should share information about significant events involving ionising radiation in a more systematic way?"

Area of Professional society	Yes	No	No answer
Interventional cardiology (4)	50%	25%	25%
Interventional radiology (12)	67%	8%	25%
Medical physics (12)	75%	8%	17%
Nuclear medicine (22)	82%	5%	13%
Radiography (11)	64%	18%	18%
Radiology (15)	67%	20%	13%
Radiology and Nuclear Medicine (1)	100%	0%	0%
Radiotherapy (15)	80%	0%	20%
Other (2)	100%	0%	0%
Average	76%	9%	15%

Survey respondents also gave examples of how CAs could share information about significant events involving ionising radiation more systematically, which can be summarised in three distinct actions.

- Official publications in the form of reports and recommendations, at least annually
- Newsletter and email dissemination of information on a monthly basis
- Recording presentations for dissemination in the community

Online Surveys (PS)

The final question in the PS survey gave the respondents the opportunity to provide general comments within the field of reporting and learning from significant events. The comments selected by the WP team as most prominent include the following items.

- "I would really be happy if the competent authority would be able to give us more professional support (via publications, organising national meetings with international experts in the field, direct discussions with institutions, etc). At the moment there is no regular activity on that; hence, an unmet need"
- "Creation of a European data repository register in which to record ionising radiation-based significant events and incidents"
- "It would be desirable to have standardisation in incident reporting and common guidelines across EU countries"
- "I think it's important to explain that radiation incidents are an important part of learning. Particularly in small centres, there may be a fear of disclosing incidents. In my opinion, in small centres it is easier to keep the event a secret than in large ones"
- "Patient safety requires training and time to dedicate to it. It is difficult to free up time to devote to these issues, especially in healthcare facilities with high healthcare activity. I believe that external audits organised by the government in collaboration with scientific societies can be of great help to improve patient safety and quality, however the logistics involved in organising such audits are not easy to implement"
- "Spain is an almost federal country, a common policy should be applied for the declaration, registration and evaluation of incidents. In addition a continuous learning system should be implemented with the collaboration of the national societies. The investments of the EC should be reviewed in countries where there is no clear commitment on this issue"
- "Incidents are reported to and handled by the national authority. Their mission could be extended to developing a system for incidence learning on a national level"

Online Surveys (Hospitals)

3.5 Analysis of Survey to Hospitals

Hospitals within the survey area were identified according to the methodology described in Section 2.2 via PSs. The survey structure is given in Annex 1. There were 58 responses from hospitals, three of which were distinct survey responses from different departments within the same hospital. This means 55 separate hospital responses were received from 19 countries out of 29 possible. No replies were received from Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Norway and Slovenia. The types of hospitals that responded are summarised in Table 25 below. Please note multiple answers regarding the type of facility were possible, hence the totals in the table are higher than the number of hospital replies received.

Table 25: Summary of types of hospital within the survey respondents

	Public	Private	University Hospital	Cancer Hospital	General Hospital
Total	32	10	27	21	19

All responding hospitals had implemented an ILS of some sort. When asked what type of local radiation event recording system they had implemented the vast majority were using electronic ILSs (35 out of 55). Of the remaining hospitals, 18 used a paper-based system, one hospital declared a local system for radiotherapy and a generic regional system, one hospital reported a general, non-specific system, and one hospital reported the use of multiple paper and electronic ILSs depending upon the department/clinic. However, it is likely that, from the 35 out of 55 hospitals reporting electronic-based ILSs, many of these will also be generic reporting systems where staff are able to report all types of local incidents.

Online Surveys (Hospitals)

Reporting of significant events to

- Radiation safety authority
- Device regulatory agency
- Pharmaceutical agency
- Both regional and national reporting

Who can be a reporter of events?

- 34/55 any staff member
- 21/55 some restrictions (certain experts, managers, etc.)

Online Surveys (Hospitals)

Staff protection and mode of reporting

- 13/55 complete anonymity
- 14/55 reporter discretion
- 21/55 restricted access to reporter identity
- 4/55 open systems

Online Surveys (Hospitals)

Analysis of reported events

- 43/55 significant events
- 35/55 near misses
- 35/55 repeated events

Where events are analysed:

- 29/54 clinical service level
- 33/54 quality and safety department (or equivalent)

Most report findings to hospital management (graded approach)

Online Surveys (Hospitals)




Fig. 19: Summary by country of numbers of hospitals regarding the status of their regularly reviewing of reported radiation events

Online Surveys (Hospitals)

Staff involved in review and analysis of reported events

- Medical physicists
- Physicians
- Radiographers
- Radiation protection officer/expert
- Quality and risk managers (less than 50%)

Training for staff

- Most for reporters, less common for review/analysis

Online Surveys (Hospitals)

Service improvement following reported events

- Improvements in written procedures
- Training of staff
- Improvements in workflow
- 2nd check of patient identity
- Standardised nomenclature and colour coding
- Double check of procedure to be performed

Online Surveys (Hospitals)




Fig. 21: Summary of sources of learning for hospitals by country

Online Surveys (Hospitals)

In terms of the free-text request for additional comments some of the more notable ones were the following.

- "A desire to more strongly couple two disparate reporting systems so that the radiation protection authority also sees the reported radiation incidents"
- "Many hospitals are not aware of what they would have to report"
- "We are trying to encourage more near misses to be reported as there is great learning from these"
- "All of the nationally reported incidents have shown a 'Swiss cheese' effect with several points of failure"
- "We have increased our emphasis on incidents reporting and in 2023 have seen an uptick in reported incidents and near misses"
- "We have a national cooperation between the hospitals in Denmark where we share knowledge from the incidents to learn from each other. We meet twice per year"

Online Surveys (Summary)

3.6 Comparative Analysis of the Three Surveys

When comparing the survey results for CAs, PSs and hospitals, the following items were identified as important to pursue in the MARLIN project final guidance document.

- The criteria for reporting events shows some hospitals were mistaken in their responses regarding who set the criteria. For instance all Swedish hospitals said criteria were set locally. However, we know from the CA survey that Sweden has set such national criteria. The Dutch hospital, though, was correct in saying there is no CA setting criteria, as these are set by the relevant PS. One hospital stated criteria were set locally and specified exactly what these criteria were. There is no way to corroborate this response, as the relevant CA did not respond to the CA survey.
- In final guidelines the MARLIN project will analyse events reported by hospitals to CAs as a function of criteria to try to answer the question “Why does France have so many reported events compared to other countries.” Do countries with low numbers have vague criteria, or is there something else standing in the way of reporting events?
- Regarding CA opinions on under-reporting, some hospitals said they or other hospitals in their country were reluctant to report for reputational reasons, and also staff in some hospitals were reluctant to report to local ILS due to fear of disciplinary action by management. Definitely a culture issue. Furthermore, some replies indicated a fear of economic consequences from reporting events to CA, which will also be addressed in the final guidance document.

Online Surveys (Summary)

3.6 Comparative Analysis of the Three Surveys

When comparing the survey results for CAs, PSs and hospitals, the following items were identified as important to pursue in the MARLIN project final guidance document.

- Professional societies indicated that the CAs should share information about significant events involving ionising radiation in a more systematic way, while CAs indicated that dissemination of information on significant events involving ionising radiation is part of their duties.
- A strong majority of PSs declared they are not directly requested by members of their society (hospitals) to assist with reported significant events.
- In summary, the survey results underline that there is a need for more interaction between CAs and PSs, as well as PSs and hospitals, i.e., the entire community, in order to efficiently use incident-reporting and learning systems to promote a safety culture within medical applications using ionising radiation.

Expert Interviews

4. Expert Interviews

4.1 Methodology

The methodology for selecting themes and questions for interviews was linked to survey replies, i.e., no predetermined themes and questions before we had received a majority of survey replies. This decision was made to be able to reflect good and suboptimal practices, as well as particularly interesting items, that were identified from survey replies. As a strategy we decided to focus on fewer interviews to allow a more in-depth exploration of items.

A decision was made to focus the interviews on CAs and hospitals. Seven CAs and eight hospitals were selected for interviews based on their survey replies. While some participants have been unresponsive, the consortium has completed interviews with four of each group.

Interviews were conducted with the following CAs.

- National Centre of Radiobiology and Radiation Protection, Bulgaria
- Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN), France
- Portuguese Environment Agency, Portugal
- Federal Office of Public Health, Switzerland

Additionally, interviews were carried out with the following hospital personnel.

- Eeva Boman, Head of Radiotherapy Physics who provides medical physics input to all event analyses and feedback to staff and managers via annual reports, Tampere University Hospital, Tampere, Finland
- Esther Angulo Pain, medical physicist responsible for patient safety strategy in Andalusia, Hospital Universitario Puerta del Mar, Cádiz, Spain
- Nadja Rystedt, Head of the Radiation Physics Department, University Hospital of Umeå, Umeå, Sweden
- Margaret Moore, Head of Radiotherapy Physics, University Hospital Galway, Ireland

Expert Interviews

Competent authorities

- Transposition of BSSD -> boost in reporting
- No concrete evidence of underreporting
- Initiate inspections based on reporting
- Main role should be dissemination of knowledge
- There should be legal protection for reporters

Expert Interviews

Hospitals

- Non-significant events outnumber significant
- Harmonisation of criteria for significant events is critical
- Most use anonymised approach for reporting
- Systems used are focused on reporting (not learning)
- EU wide communication would be appreciated

Thank you!

EC Tender project contract N° ENER/2022/NUCL/SI2.880751

SAMIRA Study on reporting and learning from patient-related incidents and near misses in radiotherapy, interventional cardiology, nuclear medicine and interventional and diagnostic radiology

Success Factors for Deploying a Reporting and Feedback System: The French Experience

Carole ROUSSE, ASN

Director - Ionising Radiation and Health Department




**MARLIN Project Workshop
September 5 & 6, Brussels**

Presentation summary

- 1. Characteristics of the French reporting and feedback system**
- 2. Some key figures**
- 3. What does feedback mean ?**
- 4. Success factors for deploying a reporting and feedback system**

1. Characteristics of the French reporting and feedback system

- Set up in 2007 in the context of a serious radiotherapy accident, with **strong health ministerial support** and the involvement of all stakeholders
- Initially a joint portal between ANSM¹ and ASN, then integration into a **single portal** for reporting events covering all health vigilances.
- **Procedures defined with stakeholders** to investigate and learn from reported events (ASN, ANSM, Ministry of health and regional health agencies, HAS⁽²⁾, Professional societies, ...)



(1) National Agency for the Safety of Medication and Health Products (2) French National Authority for Health


1. Characteristics of the French reporting and feedback system : the event reporting circuit

Type of event to be reported

ESR (1)

ESR
And
Health products
event

ESR
and
Medicines event



Reporting authority



1	Activité	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2	Déclarant (1/2)	
3	Déclarant (2/2)	
4	Évènement	
5	Circonstances et détection	
6	Conséquences, mesures conservatoires et actions correctives	
7	Patients	
8	Perte ou vol de source	
9	Dispositifs médicaux	
10	Médicaments	
11	Commentaires	
12	Pièce(s) jointe(s)	
13	Validation	

L.1333-13
Public Health Code

Immediate notification (2 working days)

ESR report to be submitted within 2 months

possibility of notifying events via the single vigilance portal or directly via the ASN teleservice

See ASN guide n°11 for the notification criteria : [Guide n°12 : Déclaration des événements significatifs dans les domaines des installations nucléaires - 09/11/2023 - ASN](#)



(1) ESR =significant radiation protection event : event to be declared to the authorities

2. Some key figures

Evolution of the number of annual ESR notified from 2010 to 2023



More than 8,000 events reported since 2007 in the medical field



Number of ESRs by activity category during the 2010-2023 period

- Half of reported events concerns patients
- A quarter of reported events concerns women ignoring their pregnancy
- A steady decline in radiotherapy and an increase in nuclear medicine and CT since 2010

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2. Some key figures : communication

Radiotherapy ASN-SFRO Scale


ASN-SFRO SCALE	EVENTS (UNPREDICTED, UNEXPECTED)	CAUSES	CONSEQUENCES (CTCAE V3.0 GRADE)
5 to 7* ACCIDENT	Death	Dose (or irradiated volume) much greater than normal resulting in complications or sequelae incompatible with life	Death
4** ACCIDENT	Serious life-threatening event, disabling complication or sequela	Dose or irradiated volume much greater than the tolerable doses or volumes	Serious unexpected or unpredictable acute or delayed effect, grade 4
3** INCIDENT	Event resulting in severe alteration of one or more organs or functions	Dose or irradiated volume greater than the tolerable doses or volumes	Severe unexpected or unpredictable acute or delayed effect, grade 3
2** INCIDENT	Event resulting in or likely to result in moderate alteration of an organ or function	Dose greater than the recommended doses, or irradiation of a volume that may lead to unexpected but moderate complications	Moderate unexpected or unpredictable acute or delayed effect, grade 2, minimal or absence of alteration of quality of life
1 EVENT	Event with dosimetric consequences but no expected clinical consequence	Dose or volume error (e.g. dose error or target error in a session not compensable over the treatment as a whole)	No symptom expected
0 EVENT	Event with no consequence for the patient	Dose error (number of monitor units, filter, etc.) compensated over the treatment as a whole. Error of identification of a patient treated for the same pathology (compensable)	

* In the case of deaths of several patients:
 • the minimum level 5 is raised to 6 if the number of patients is greater than 1 but less than or equal to 10;
 • the minimum level 5 is raised to 7 if the number of patients is greater than 10.
 ** If the number of patients is greater than 1, a + sign is added to the assigned level (example: 3 become 3+).

- Needed after a severe accident to provide the public with accessible information and to facilitate the understanding of the severity of an event
- Elaborated in July, 2007 by ASN with SFRO
- Referring to CTCAE scale



Incident notice : ≥ 2 or >1 for a cohort of patients



No patient scale outside radiotherapy



16 incident notices (patient event) published: mainly interventional radioguided procedures and nuclear medicine




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3. What does feedback mean?

Feedback at the clinical facility level

Internal ASN feedback

Feedback at the national level and dissemination



Exchanges between authorities and professional societies to build on experience feedback

2 incidents learning committees on imaging and therapy



Incident notices, case report of an incident (serious one), information during inspection

Circular letters sent to all services

Bulletin « The safety of the patient », feedbacks sheets

Recommandations from health authorities or professional societies

Publication of scientific articles

Participation in congresses or seminars

Changes in regulation, trainings improvement

3. What does feedback mean ? Bulletin « The safety of the patient », feedbacks sheets, circular letters

letters

radiotherapy and brachytherapy

others

Patient safety
Paving the way for progress

N°6
May 2014

Laterality errors

Patient safety
Paving the way for progress

N°9
September 2016

High-precision hypofractionated irradiation

PATIENT SAFETY
PAVING THE WAY FOR PROGRESS

October 2023

PROSPECTIVE RISK ANALYSIS:
EXAMPLE OF INTERRUPTIONS
IN THE TREATMENT PROCESS

Newsletter for radiotherapy professionals

> Experience feedback
Focus on an event notified to ASN through vigie-radiotherapie.fr

May 2014

Avoiding a positioning error during kV-kV imaging

Positioning of the patient during treatment under the accelerator can be checked periodically using an imaging system capturing images in kilovoltage mode (kV-kV), by locating bone structures. Positioning errors may be associated with an error identifying a bone marker.

5 patient positioning errors associated with incorrect identification of a vertebral marker on a kV image were notified to ASN between June 2013 and February 2014. One of the notifying centres shares its analysis and measures for avoiding positioning errors during kV-kV imaging.

> The significant event in brief

Patient treated for a bronchial tumour with oblique fields at a total dose of 40 Gy (20 sessions of 2 Gy).

In addition to an MV image on day 0 and then weekly, a daily check of patient positioning is made by kV-kV imaging (orthogonal images).

Repositioning is carried out by checking the alignment of the spinous processes (see picture below).

Daily kV-kV images are approved by a radiation oncologist at least twice a week.

During the first 4 to 10 sessions, a positioning error of 2.5 cm occurred longitudinally (head to feet).

The error was detected by a radiographer during the 10th session.

Verification of the positioning of a patient through the registration of a DRR and a kV image (side view (left) and anterior-posterior view (right)).

PATIENT SAFETY
PAVING THE WAY FOR PROGRESS

May 2023

MASTERING MEDICAL DEVICES IN FLUOROSCOPY-GUIDED INTERVENTIONAL PRACTICES: A COLLABORATIVE EFFORT

Newsletter for medical professionals involved in fluoroscopy-guided interventional practices

> Experience feedback
Focus on an event notified to ASN

March 2020

Choice of dose calibrator preset

In 2019, errors in the choice of dose calibrator preset when preparing radiopharmaceutical resulted in the administration of incorrect activities doses and the overexposure of several patients. The experience feedback from the two centres concerned by these events is shared to prevent that type of errors

> The significant events in brief

Failure to verify the dose calibrator preset of the syringe preparation enclosure when measuring the activity to administer for scintigraphic examinations (bone, cardiac and exploration of the parathyroid glands) with technetium 99m, led to the overexposure of 10 patients (up to 1.5 times the prescribed dose).

In another centre, but for the same reason, after the daily dose calibrator constancy check, selection of the wrong radiopharmaceutical for the preparation of syringes of 18-FDG led to the overexposure of 7 patients (6.5 times the prescribed dose). In this case the event was not detected until the 8th syringe was being prepared, when the lack of activity in the multi-dose container became apparent.

> Analysis of causes and influencing factors

Organisational and human factors

Technical factors

EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK

SPOTLIGHT ON AN EVENT NOTIFIED TO ASN
April 2024

Accidental change in the exposure settings of a mobile radiology device

The combination of a particularity in the design of the mobile radiology device and lack of knowledge of the steps for stopping and restarting it leads to additional exposure in children. Following on from the Bordeaux University Hospital, several centres have informed ASN that they have come across the same problems. Other notifications could follow. Let's take a closer look at this social event in the light of the Bordeaux hospital's experience.

THE EVENT IN BRIEF

A dosimetric study by the medical physics team of the Bordeaux University Hospital in connection with a recent Irish publication of Local Dose Reference Levels on infants, revealed the delivery of a large number of higher-than-expected doses during radiography examinations carried out using FUJIFILM's FDR Nano mobile radiography device in paediatric, neonatology and maternity departments.

The retrospective analysis of the doses delivered by these devices and recorded by the DACS¹, showed that the problem concerned 248 children between 2022 and 2023. These doses, representing a few tens of microsieverts, have no clinical consequences and require no specific monitoring.

The result from the use of adult pulmonary radiography constants (85 kV and 1575 mAs) whereas the users thought they were using paediatric radiography constants. Depending on the order in which the mobile imaging device is switched off, switched back on, and the protocol and patient's name are entered, the exposure parameters can change. This is because setting the main switch to the powered off position (key turned to OFF) does not switch off the console; the console remains on unless switched off separately. In this situation the users can select the name of the patient and choose the corresponding radiological protocol on the console, which is still powered on, but they cannot use the light beam centring device and deliver the X-rays. In this case the users must actuate the main switch (key turned to ON) to power on the tube and the beam centring device. Doing this immediately changes the previously selected exposure parameters, replacing them with the adult thorax radiography parameters, set in the factory. The device does not send a warning message or enter a fault condition to prevent the taking of a radiograph following the change in exposure constants.

ANPPh

ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE
AUTORITÉ DE SÛRETÉ NUCLEAIRE
REPUBLICQUE FRANÇAISE

ASN
ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE
AUTORITÉ DE SÛRETÉ NUCLEAIRE

IONISING RADIATION AND HEALTH DEPARTMENT

Monteorge, July 26th 2016

COOP-DS-206-62742

Adressées et cc,

Subject: ASN recommendation concerning the handling of radiopharmaceutical (MRP) and the administration of MRP to patients following an ergonomic study performed by IRSN within an in vivo nuclear medicine unit

Dear Sir or Madam,

Since July 2007, when the criteria for notification of significant radiation protection events was put into place, ASN has registered about 800 events notified by nuclear medicine departments. Of these, 50% concern patients. These events, most of which were of no consequence for the patients, involved errors in the activity of the MRP administration, as well as a lack of verification of the identity of the patient.

In a circular of 22nd May 2013, I informed you of the lessons learned from feedback from the ESR, of which ASN was regularly notified of similar events, at a rate of about fifty per year and certain departments are faced with the recurrence of MRP administration errors despite the corrective measures taken following the assessment they caused out.

In order to understand the reasons for this recurrence of events, even though there are no clinical consequences for the patients, and the lack of effectiveness of the corrective measures taken, ASN made a proposal to a nuclear medicine department with a good culture of confidence, yet still faced with these difficulties, to run an assessment of organisational and human factors.

The organisational and human factors approach to safety consists in identifying and implementing the conditions conducive to a positive contribution to safety by professionals and groups. It allows a clearer understanding of what determines human activity and makes it possible to influence the design of

calibrator and software, messages if the error and the ability, selecting repaired is not of the dose for different or and/or of a good visual

1 Definition of the appendix to ASN Resolution 2014-DC-0463 of 23rd October 2014 concerning minimum design, operation and maintenance rules to be met by in vivo nuclear medicine facilities: "operation concerning handling radiopharmaceuticals with a view to administering them to patients, such as placing an MRP in a syringe, reconstruction, preparation, etc."

2 Lessons learned from events notified to the French nuclear safety Authority during 2007-2013 in the medical field: Radiative protection Documentary (2014-61-67)

Circular letters concerning the handling of radiopharmaceuticals and the administration of MRP to patients following an ergonomic study performed by IRSN within an in vivo nuclear medicine unit

3. What does feedback mean? Recommendations from health authorities or professional societies

Le 13 juin 2016

Recommandations relatives à la formation à l'utilisation des dispositifs médicaux émetteurs de rayonnements ionisants

Domaine d'application :
Dispositifs médicaux émetteurs de rayonnements ionisants, équipements utilisés en imagerie médicale notamment pour la radiologie conventionnelle, la scintigraphie, la radiologie interventionnelle, l'imagerie interventionnelle et actes radioguidés

Contexte

Les événements de radioprotection relatifs à l'ASST concernent des patients dans le domaine médical mettant en évidence que les causes sont multifactorielles et principalement d'origine organisationnelle et humaine. Des améliorations dans la formation des utilisateurs, notamment lors de l'acquisition des appareils équipés, ont pu être identifiées comme l'un des leviers essentiels à la maîtrise d'un événement.

Un dispositif médical doit être « dûment formé, correctement installé, entretenu et utilisé conformément à la destination selon l'article R. 5211-17 du code de la santé publique et « accompagné des informations nécessaires pour permettre une utilisation correcte et en toute sécurité, en tenant compte de la formation et des connaissances des utilisateurs potentiels ». Ces dispositions du code de la santé publique sont des modalités d'application avant concertation, et imposent par conséquent une obligation de formation de l'utilisateur à l'utilisation du dispositif médical.

Ce document qui vise à améliorer la formation des utilisateurs de dispositifs médicaux émetteurs de rayonnements ionisants constitue l'ASST en collaboration avec l'AFR, l'AFRPE, le CA, la SFPR et la SYNTEMI et la participation de l'ANSDP, à l'élaboration du code national de formation basé sur les bonnes pratiques.

Les recommandations proposées ont pour objectif premier de mettre à disposition des chefs d'établissement¹ et des formateurs les éléments nécessaires pour définir l'offre de formation et assurer le déploié auprès des professionnels.

Il est recommandé que la qualité et les objectifs pédagogiques de la formation soient clairement définis ainsi que les responsabilités respectives du formateur et du chef d'établissement.

Cette formation s'attachera à présenter les aspects pratiques et concepts (fonctionnalités, réglages, utilisation...) d'un dispositif médical et non pas les aspects généraux d'une modalité.

¹ Décret n° 42 / CEE « Dispositifs médicaux du 14 mai 1993 (annexe 1 paragraphe 13.6)

² Association de soins médicaux, Association Française des Algébristes Biomédicaux, Association Française des Pédiatres, Association Française d'Electroradiologie, Conseil Professionnel de la Radiologie Française (CPR), Société Française de Pédiatrie Médicale, Syndicat national de l'industrie des technologies médicales, Agence nationale de sécurité du médicament et des produits de santé

³ Le terme « chef d'établissement » est utilisé de façon générique dans ce document mais il peut également s'agir de la personne plurilingue ou monale ayant fait la déclaration ou étant titulaire d'une autorisation à utiliser un dispositif médical émetteur de rayonnements ionisants

✓ **Recommendations for training users of medical devices using ionizing radiation**

AMÉLIORATION DES PRATIQUES

Améliorer le suivi des patients en radiologie interventionnelle et actes radioguidés

Réduire le risque d'effets déterministes

✓ **Improving patient follow-up in interventional radiology and radioguided procedures: reducing the risk of deterministic effect**

Guide Pratique de Radiologie Interventionnelle

Accueil | Recommandations générales | Actes spécifiques

GUIDE PRATIQUE DE RADIOLOGIE INTERVENTIONNELLE

Ce Guide pratique de radiologie interventionnelle vous est proposé par la Société française de radiologie et sa Fédération de radiologie interventionnelle (SFR-FRI) avec pour ambition de :

- proposer un complément original au Guide Pratique (diagnostique) à l'usage des médecins radiologues, paru en 2009;
- décrire les recommandations et prérequis indispensables à l'exercice et à la réalisation de l'ensemble des activités interventionnelles ;
- établir un certain nombre de fiches d'actes spécifiques pour chaque geste considéré comme important, emblématique de la pathologie concernée ;
- apporter aux praticiens un support original, complet, susceptible d'évoluer, de se modifier en fonction des nouvelles techniques thérapeutiques.

L'évolutivité indispensable à ces objectifs a imposé le choix d'une publication électronique, qui seule permet de modifier rapidement le contenu, aussi souvent que nécessaire.

Ce Guide comporte deux parties :

- des recommandations générales portant sur :
 - l'hygiène en radiologie interventionnelle qui est un problème récurrent ;
 - la radioprotection est toujours à l'ordre du jour, qui concerne le patient et aussi le radiologue ;
 - la gestion des risques est particulièrement détaillée ;
 - un chapitre est consacré aux matériaux à la fois de cathétérisme et pour les dispositifs implantables (DMI) ;
 - la responsabilité en radiologie interventionnelle est une thématique de plus en plus incontournable.
- une série de fiches d'actes spécifiques dont chacune résume le point de vue clinique, la pertinence de la demande du geste, l'explication claire et détaillée, des biens d'imagerie préalables indispensables, la description de l'acte technique avec ses contrôles fondamentaux pour une parfaite maîtrise de l'acte lui-même et de ses risques.

Sont également abordés les comptes-rendus écrits, leur transmission rapide aux collègues cliniciens et les consignes de suivi. Ces habitudes doivent positionner le radiologue interventionnel comme thérapeute référent dans la chaîne des soins, au même titre que sa présence systématique dans les RCP spécifiques. Ces documents seront révisés et complétés régulièrement au fil du temps. Ce guide se veut avant tout un outil pratique, dédié notamment à la formation de nos jeunes collègues, pour amplifier l'attractivité de la radiologie interventionnelle.

✓ **Interventional radiology practical guide published in 2009 by SFR**

Campus de Neurochirurgie

Accueil | Le Collège des Campus | Diplôme de Compétence Etendue en Radiochirurgie et Radiothérapie Stéréotaxiques

Diplôme de Compétence Etendue en Radiochirurgie et Radiothérapie Stéréotaxiques

Ce diplôme permet d'acquies une compétence supplémentaire professionnelle pour la prise en charge par Radiochirurgie et Radiothérapie Stéréotaxiques.

Dates et lieux des enseignements

- 7 octobre 2024 (Toulouse) : UE 9 Tête et Cou, radiothérapie stéréotaxique et UE 10 Indications extra-encéphaliques
- 16-17 septembre 2024 (Marseille) : UE 7 Neurochirurgie fonctionnelle
- 15-16 avril 2024 (Lille) : UE 1. Soins de connaissances basiques, UE 2. Aspects de diagnostic des UE 3 et 4th Sécurité et



Introduction of an Extended Competence Diploma in Stereotactic Radiosurgery and Radiotherapy by the French Society of Neurosurgery

4. Success factors for deploying a reporting and feedback system



EC Tender project contract N° ENER/2022/NUCL/SI2.880751

SAMIRA Study on reporting and learning from patient-related incidents and near misses in radiotherapy, interventional cardiology, nuclear medicine and interventional and diagnostic radiology

The German Incident Reporting System

Erik Mille



MARLIN Project Workshop
September 5 & 6, Brussels

The Basis


Federal level

- Radiation Protection Act
- Radiation Protection Ordinance
“Strahlenschutzverordnung” (StrlSchV)
- Central body at the Federal Office for Radiation Protection

State level (16 States)

- State administration on behalf of the federation
- Regional competent supervisory authorities (n = 46)

The Structure



D

One size
fits all

Incident (sect. 1, subsect. 2)

Medicine is a
planned exposure
situation

Without
individual
justification

- Event in a planned exposure situation
- that led, **could have led or could lead** to an **unanticipated exposure**
- including hazardous incidents and emergencies


Near-
misses

Reporting a sign **Non-exclusive** (sect. 108 StrlSchV)


Medicine

- **particular** deemed significant **Vague legal concept** criteria in **Annex 14** or 15 is satisfied
- Report to the competent authority **without undue delay**
- **Summary report** to the competent authority **within 6 month**


Criteria for Significance




Criteria for Significance




Criteria for Significance



Criteria for Significance



Workflow (Practitioner's View)





**Federal Office for
Radiation Protection**

Federal Office for Radiation Protection

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Socialmedia



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[@strahlenschutz_bfs](https://www.instagram.com/strahlenschutz_bfs)



[@bfsbund](https://www.youtube.com/@bfsbund)



Bundesamt für
Strahlenschutz

Contact for questions

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+49 3018 333 2321

EC Tender project contract N° ENER/2022/NUCL/SI2.880751

SAMIRA Study on reporting and learning from patient-related incidents and near misses in radiotherapy, interventional cardiology, nuclear medicine and interventional and diagnostic radiology

PRISMA-RT in Belgium: A Common Methodology to Analyse All (Near)-Incidents in Radiotherapy

Aude Vaandering

(Cliniques Universitaires St Luc, Brussels, Belgium)

MARLIN Project Workshop
September 5 & 6, Brussels



Context



Belgian National Regulatory body (AFCN/FANC)

- **Mandatory notification** of all significant events* in radiology, nuclear medicine, interventional radiology and radiotherapy
 - **Voluntary notification** of events that are of potential interest to other departments
- Anonymized reports (with content of event and set improvement actions) is sent to all departments (++ for RT)
- MAY lead to a visit of the department by the FANC/AFCN



Radiotherapy

- **2010 National Cancer Plan** financed:
 - One FTE quality manager per RT department
 - A national platform for incident reporting and learning



Radiotherapy




- **2010 National Cancer** plan financed:
 - One FTE quality manager per RT department
 - A national platform for incident reporting and learning

→ Decision to use the **PRISMA-RT platform**




PRISMA-RT

- PRISMA-RT* = methodology for the retrospective analysis of reported events developed for RT (MAASTRO)
- Methodology focusing on the identification of **causes** that lead events




PRISMA-RT

- PRISMA-RT* = methodology for the retrospective analysis of reported events developed for RT (MAASTRO)
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PRISMA-RT

- PRISMA-RT* = methodology for the retrospective analysis of reported events developed for RT (MAASTRO)
- Methodology focusing on the identification of **causes** that lead event



Practical Benefits

- Common analysis methodology used by all RT departments
 - Common language to discuss adverse events, issues and projects
 - Encouraged collaboration between departments and quality managers (QMs)




Belgian Quality Managers in Radiotherapy

Practical Benefits

- Common analysis methodology used by all RT departments
 - Common language to discuss adverse events, issues and projects
 - Encouraged collaboration between departments and quality managers (QM)
- Analysis methodology that is also used for the mandatory declarations of events
- Allows for (potential) benchmarking between departments

PRISMA-RT.BE




PRISMA-RT platform:

- Importation of:
 - Date of events
 - Root causes classifications
 - Context variables

!! *Sharing of root cause analyses of events, **not** of events themselves*


Benchmarking

1. Allows for the visualization of a dept's data versus other depts




Benchmarking

2. Allows for trending analysis on a national basis



Benchmarking


2. Allows for trending analysis on a national basis



Benchmarking

2. Allows for trending analysis on a national basis

→ Can facilitate the setup of national quality/safety improvement projects



PRISMA-RT
de eerste vereniging in de gezondheidszorg
die incidentdata benchmarkt

Patra Reijnders¹, Margreet Bijl², Monique Rozzen³, Jo Duwvier⁴, Rogier Wessels⁵,
Ulrike Neurburg⁶, Oda Wijers⁷, Jergen Bogaard van den⁷

1: MAASTRO clinic (afdeling radiotherapie) Maastricht
2: Erasmus MC (afdeling radiotherapie) Rotterdam
3: Catharina Ziekenhuis (afdeling radiotherapie) Eindhoven
4: ZFTI (afdeling radiotherapie) Vlissingen
5: VUmc (afdeling radiotherapie) Amsterdam
6: AMC (afdeling radiotherapie) Amsterdam
7: RIF (afdeling radiotherapie) Leeuwarden

De ontwikkeling van een nationaal patiëntveiligheid netwerk voor de Nederlandse Radiotherapie genaamd PRISMA-RT.
Dit is gebaseerd op de benchmark van incident analyses (PRISMA) tussen 17 radiotherapie-instellingen. De weg ernaar toe en ervaringen worden in deze publicatie gedeeld.

PRISMA-RT


Samenvatting
In 2016 is de vereniging PRISMA-RT opgericht, een samenwerkingsverband van 17 van de 21 Nederlandse radiotherapie instellingen.
Deze radiotherapie instellingen ontwikkelen een nationale database. Dit veiligheidsnetwerk is ontstaan uit 2 samenwerkingsprojecten op het gebied van procesmatig bijhouden incidenten. Het doel is primair het verbeteren van processen en verhogen van patiëntveiligheid in de radiotherapie door het vergelijken van
bepaalde zaken van incidenten. Naast vergelijken op instellingniveau is dit ook op nationaal niveau mogelijk. Alle instellingen gebruiken de PRISMA-methode om hun (bijna)-incidenten te analyseren.
Naast de standaarddatabase van TPOC (The Patient Safety Company), wordt specifiek voor deze samenwerkingsverband een benchmark module ontwikkeld. Daarnaast is er een website ontwikkeld (www.prisma-rt.nl).

Jul 2016 | jaargang 60 | nummer 3 | pagina 7

<https://www.prisma-rt.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/PRISMA-RT-de-eerste-vereniging-in-de-gezondheidszorg-die-incidentdata-benchmarkt-NL.pdf>

Use of PRISMA-RT in Belgium

- 100% of departments (n=26) have been trained in using the methodology
→ Continuous training is required
- 67% of department send in reports (=date of event)
- 30% of departments actively contribute to PRISMA-RT platform



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


WHY?

- Issues with third party hospital incident reporting systems (technical issues, bugs...)
- Absence/no quality managers
- No dedicated PRISMA-RT benchmark project/data manager




↓ Incentive



Future Prospects

- Dedicated project manager?
- Event level classification and benchmarking



- Adding proactive risk analysis at a benchmarking level

Conclusions

- PRISMA-RT methodology has been implemented in **all** Belgian RT departments
 - Common language and best practice exchange amongst departments
 - Facilitated by the existence of dedicated personnel (quality managers) in RT departments
- Constructive national/multicentric benchmarking requires dedicated resources
- Potential to further develop the national platform to include event level information and proactive risk analysis tools

Thank you



Belgian Quality Managers in Radiotherapy

Aude Vaandering Aude.vaandering@saintluc.uclouvain.be

EC Tender project contract N° ENER/2022/NUCL/SI2.880751

SAMIRA Study on reporting and learning from patient-related incidents and near misses in radiotherapy, interventional cardiology, nuclear medicine and interventional and diagnostic radiology

Discussion

16:30–17:15



MARLIN Project Workshop
September 5 & 6, Brussels

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Conclusions & Recommendations

G. Paulo



MARLIN Project Workshop
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See you tomorrow at 09:00!

Wrap-up of day 1

J. Andersson

MARLIN Project Workshop
September 5 & 6, Brussels

